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H.R. 3641: Mitigating Antitrust Sanctions
for Research and Development Joint
Ventures
I. Introduction
Although the joint venture' has existed for centuries,' in the
two decades following the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.3 finding the Clayton Acte ap-
1. There is no generally accepted definition of the term "joint venture." This Com-
ment will confine the discussion to the joint venture described by Pitofsky, Joint Ven-
tures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82
HAsv. L. Rxv. 1007, 1016-17 (1969) (creation of an entity of new or different capacity
where ownership of the capital stock is split among independent entities), and the re-
search and development program as described in H.R. 3641, 98th Cong., 1st Seas., 129
CONG. Rac. 5548 (1983). See Appendix for the complete text of the proposed Bill.
2. See J. TAUBMAN, THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAX CLASSnICATION 27-81 (1957) (trac-
ing the joint venture to Babylonian "commenda" and Roman "societas").
3. 378 U.S. 158 (1964), on remand, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), affd, 389 U.S.
308 (1967).
Pennsalt Chemical Corporation and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation formed
the jointly owned Penn.Olin Chemical Corporation to produce and sell sodium chlorate
in the southeastern part of the United States. Pennsalt was the third largest producer of
sodium chlorate in the country but its plant was located in Oregon, far from the south-
eastern market. Prior to the joint venture, Olin purchased a large amount of sodium
chlorate for resale and had a dominant hold of the sodium chlorate sales in the south-
east. The joint venture enabled Pennsalt to enter a new market with a new plant and an
established sales force. It also allowed Olin to produce a chemical which it had formerly
only bought for resale. Id. at 163-65.
The Supreme Court rejected the district court's reasoning that in order for the joint
venture to have "restrained competition," both parent corporations would have had to
have been probable market entrants. For the Supreme Court it was enough if the joint
venture foreclosed the entry of even one parent who would have probably entered the
market independently in the absence of the joint venture. Id. at 173-74.
4. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (original version at ch. 323,
§ 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)). Section 7 provides, in relevant part-
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall ac-
quire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock . . .of another
person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where...
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.
Id.
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plicable to the creation" of a joint venture, American business
has become increasingly wary of the potential antitrust compli-
cations the joint venture poses." The joint venture framework
offers several economic advantages to its participants;7 at the
same time it creates concern over possible impediments to free
competition in violation of the antitrust laws.8 These competing
economic tensions produce an atmosphere for heated debate on
the need for innovation and technological advancement free
from government regulation in American industry9 and the need
for increased protection of the public through the antitrust
laws. 10
H.R. 364111 was recently introduced 2 in the House of Rep-
resentatives. The Bill attempts to give industry the impetus to
innovate by conducting research and development through joint
ventures. It would limit some of the sanctions normally available
for violations of the antitrust laws, if those violations arise from
the operations of the joint venture.1 3
5. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition of stock prohibition of § 7 of the
Clayton Act, see id., applied with equal force to the "joint participation of two corpora-
tions in the creation of a third as a new domestic producing organization." Penn-Olin,
378 U.S. at 168-69 (footnote omitted). See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
6. Indicative of this increased attention is the flood of literature on the joint ven-
ture. For the most helpful of the secondary sources documenting this increased atten-
tion, see M. HOWARD, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION (1983); Brodley, Joint Ven-
tures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1521 (1982); Brodley, The Legal Status of
Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST
BULL. 453 (1976); Favretto, Application of the Sherman Act to Joint Ventures and Op-
erations of Multinational Corporations, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 465 (1982); Fox, Application
of the Clayton Act to International Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures, 50 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 477 (1982); Fox, Joint Research and Patent Pools, in TWENTIETH ANNUAL
ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR 353 (1980); Pitofsky, supra note 1.
7. See infra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 38-65 and accompanying text.
9. For a particularly adamant view, see D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY:
ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE 271-78 (1982); cf. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, supra note 6, at 1571 (permissive antitrust policy is justified for research joint
ventures).
10. See, e.g., M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WASSESTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYS-
TEM passim (1972).
11. See H.R. 3641, supra note 1 and Appendix.
12. Rep. Fish (R. - N.Y.) introduced the Bill on July 25, 1983. It was co-sponsored
by Rep. Crockett (D. - Mich.), Rep. Edwards (D. - Cal.), Rep. Frank (D. - Mass.), Rep.
Hyde (R. - Ill.), Rep. Lundgren (R. - Cal.), Rep. Mazzoli (D. - Ky.), Rep. Moorhead (R. -
Cal.), and Rep. Sawyer (R. -Mich.), and was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
13. H.R. 3641, supra note 1 and Appendix; see infra notes 96-126 and accompanying
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This Comment examines the provisions of the proposed Bill
and their probable effect, if enacted, on antitrust policy and en-
forcement. Part II puts the Bill in historical perspective and will
briefly trace the interaction of the joint venture and the anti-
trust laws. Part III discusses the provisions of H.R. 3641 in the
context of existing statutory law. Part IV examines the intended
effect of the Bill on antitrust sanctions and the structuring of
corporate entities. Part V concludes that H.R. 3641 would en-
courage research and development joint ventures by eliminating
the threat of treble damage actions, but that the Bill, as it
stands, unnecessarily protects joint ventures engaging in applied
research.
II. Background
It is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a definition of
the term "joint venture" on which all would agree. It has been
described as "[mi]ore than a simple contract yet less than a
merger,"" and as a form of "quasi-merger." 15 A leading com-
mentator came closest to a comprehensive definition when he
described the joint venture as a "joint creation of new servicing
or productive capacity, or the reorganization of existing capacity
so as to create substantially new or different services or prod-
ucts, where the majority of capital stock is held by two corporate
parents.""6
Creating an independent entity distinct from the parent
corporations for the limited purposes of a joint venture may be
preferable to a merger of the parent corporations. 17 With in-
text.
14. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A
Summary Assessment, supra note 6, at 454.
15. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
136 (1959); Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1007.
16. Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1016. Pitofsky elaborates that the concept of joint
venture should be limited by the degree of integration of production, management, dis-
tribution and financial functions of the entity. If there is no substantial integration of
these functions then the joint venture simply masks a consensual cartel. If the integra-
tion is complete, or substantially so, between the parent entities, then merger rules
would apply. Id. Pitofsky speaks of the prototypical joint venture. Id. at 1017. A venture
may, of course, include more than two corporate parents.
17. M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 243. A merger may not be a legal choice. Many
foreign governments require that a foreign company doing business within their borders
1984]
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creasing frequency companies have resorted to the joint venture
as a means of avoiding the strict limitations on expansion
through horizontal18 and vertical' s merger.2 0 Thus, joint ventures
have recently attracted considerable attention. Of the two prin-
cipal types of joint ventures,"1 the more important for the pur-
poses of this Comment is that which is formed to enable the
participants to pool their resources to engage in extraordinarily
costly activities (e.g., research and development) using the econ-
omies of scale made possible by the pooling of assets.2
There are several plain advantages to creating a joint ven-
ture to carry out research and development. The joint venture
permits research on a product, process, or technique which the
concerns, acting alone, would be unable to undertake without
these economies of scale. 3 It also enables the research to be con-
ducted more efficiently. For instance, a group of small compa-
nies conducting joint research may be better able to compete
be co-owned by their own national companies. The enterprise inspiring the joint venture
may be a short-lived, one-time effort, making merger inappropriate (e.g., cooperation on
the building of a hydroelectric project). The project contemplated might also be too im-
mense or too costly for one entity to tackle alone, yet the firm involved may want to
retain their independence upon completion of the project. Id.
18. A "horizontal merger involves firms directly competing in the sale of similar
goods or services." Id. at 106. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
334-35 (1962).
19. A "vertical merger represent[s] the combining together of firms operating in dif-
ferent stages of the same industry that have been in an actual or potential buyer-seller
relationship." M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 106. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. at 323-24 ; United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586, 592 (1957).
20. Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1007. The FTC reports that between 1972 and 1978
there were 1083 joint ventures to approximately 11,318 mergers, a substantial increase
from the fairly limited use in the 1950s. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATISTICAL RE-
PORT ON MERGERS AND AcQUISIrIONS 1978, at 25, 228 (1980).
21. See, e.g., C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 15, at 136 (describing a
joint venture formed to share unusual risks that would not be undertaken by any
single firm; and the joint venture which enables the participants to achieve econo-
mies of scale in the performance of certain functions . . . which are most effi-
ciently carried on by units much larger than could be supported by any individual
firm).
22. Cf. M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 240 (distinguishing a joint venture from a pool-
ing arrangement "in which firms in a market collectively determine their operations and
pool their profits. Such arrangements pool income, not assets.").
23. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17 (1945); United States
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 397 (1912); M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 242-43.
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with much larger companies.24 In addition, the combined and
complementary expertise employed in joint research allows the
venture to work efficiently and avoids the needless and wasteful
duplication of efforts that would be probable if the parties were
to act separately.' 5
Another major advantage of the joint venture is that of
spreading the risks of undertaking the research among the par-
ticipants in the venture. Basic research is an inherently risky ac-
tivity; costs are high and profitability is speculative.' 6 Unless
patented or cloaked in secrecy, the research work product can be
appropriated by competitors with little, if any, research expendi-
tures.27 A company can thus use a joint venture to increase its
return on its research investment by ensuring that those profit-
ing from the research also share in its costs.' 8 The joint venture
also permits research that would be too costly to pursue inde-
pendently to progress through the combined resources of the
joint structure' Thus, with its ability to spread the costs and
the risks of an expensive activity, the joint venture is particu-
larly well-suited to conducting research and development. While
the joint venture has its advantages for the business community,
it is not without significant antitrust problems.
A joint venture must be carefully organized to avoid the
sanctions of several applicable antitrust laws. 0 The Sherman
Act,'1 in broad terms, proscribes monopolies, attempts to mo-
24. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 600 (1972).
25. See Baker, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Joint Ventures, in EIGHEENTH
ANNuAL ADVANcED ANTITRUST SEMINAR 125, 141 (1978).
26. Id. at 142; cf. M. HOwARD, supra note 6, at 250 (noting that the sharing of these
costs and risks within the joint venture structure is an advantage to society because it
induces more firms to undertake research).
27. Brodley, Joint Venture and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1570.
28. Id. at 1571.
29. Note, Joint Research Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
Rzv. 1112, 1113 (1971); see Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6,
at 1571.
Brodley states: "If in the absence of the joint venture no firm would undertake the
task, an important function will go unperformed." Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint
Ventures under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, supra note 6, at 468. This
is especially true "where the joint venture market is highly concentrated and the parents'
market [is] relatively less [concentrated]." Id.
30. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Gum CONCERNING REsEARcH
JOINT VENTuRES 10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REsEARCH Gum].
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The provisions are, in relevant part:
1984]
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nopolize, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. The Sherman
Act was the only antitrust statute relevant to the joint venture
until United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.32 where the Su-
preme Court held that the Clayton Act's was applicable to joint
ventures. 4
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate acquisi-
tions and mergers whose effect may be to reduce competition
substantially." The prohibition embodied in section 7 is, there-
fore, implicated at the inception of the joint venture, since its
formation usually involves the acquisition of stock or assets." In
addition, the Clayton Act provides the statutory treble damages
remedy for private litigants injured by antitrust violations.37
Enforcing the antitrust laws in the context of joint ventures
presents the formidable task of reaching a balance between en-
couraging much-needed research and maintaining a competitive
environment in which to conduct it.3s Simply interposing the la-
bel of "joint venture" will not save a business entity from in-
spection under the antitrust laws; courts will look closely at the
§ 1 Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
§ 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person . . . to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony ....
Id. at §§ 1-2.
32. 378 U.S. 158 (1964), on remand, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd, 389 U.S.
308 (1967). See supra note 3.
33. Clayton Act § 7, 15.U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (original version at ch.
323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)).
34. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 168-69.
35. See supra note 4. Section 7 now applies to acquisitions by noncorporate entities
as well as corporations. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
349, § 6, 94 Stat. 1154, 1157-58 (1980).
36. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Brodley, The Legal
Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, supra
note 6, at 472.
37. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (original version at ch.
323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914)). The section provides that "[a]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor in any district court ... without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained." Id.
38. See Baker, supra note 25, at 164; Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy,
supra note 6, at 1571; cf. M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 251 (restraints need to be more
than offset by any gains to competition).
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purposes and the actual effects of the entity within the relevant
market.8 9 Although the majority of joint ventures seem not to be
in conflict with the antitrust laws,40 even a significant minority
of questionable practices would give rise to a considerable prob-
lem. While the terminology may differ,41 courts and antitrust
commentators have identified three principal areas of antitrust
concern relating to joint ventures: the "bottleneck" monopoly,4
the presence of unreasonable collateral restraints,43 and the
elimination of potential competition.44
The problem created by the "bottleneck" monopoly is that
of the joint venture which restricts access to a facility that is
essential to successful competition in a market. By denying ac-
cess to a facility, a joint venture effectively excludes market
competitors from the market itself. 45 This denial of access can
be in the form of preventing entry into the market or re-
straining movement backward to the source of supply.47 That a
39. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-99
(1951).
40. M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 244 (citing K. Ewing, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, Federal Antitrust Enforcement: A Partnership with the
Private Bar, Remarks before the North Carolina Bar Foundation, Raleigh, N.C. 3 (Jan.
19, 1980) (noting a 90% rate for joint ventures cleared under the Department's business
review procedure)).
41. Compare Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1530-
33 (market exclusion and access discrimination, collusion, and loss of potential competi-
tion) with Baker, supra note 25, at 130 (bottleneck, ancillary restraints, and elimination
of present competition), U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OP-
ERATIONS 23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INT'L GUIDE] (essential facility, collateral re-
straints, elimination of existing significant competition), and M. HowARD, supra note 6,
at 244-50 (bottleneck, market sharing, ancillary restraints, spillover problem, and poten-
tial competition).
42. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. at 18; United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. at 409.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 618 (C.D.
Cal. 1969) (consent decree), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, Grossman v.
Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 961-62 (D. Mass. 1950).
44. See, e.g., Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 172-74.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 324 U.S. at 409 (the defendant,
by denying a competitor railroad company access to its switching station, was taking an
action tantamount to preventing the competitor from entering the market at all).
46. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. at 18; United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 324 U.S. at 409.
47. See INT'L GUIDE, supra note 41, at 58-61. The Int'l Guide gives the hypothetical
example in Case M, of a joint venture of American and European oil companies estab-
1984]
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joint venture has "bottleneck" characteristics, however, does not
make the venture unlawful per se; if an entity of that size and
character is necessary to achieve the economies needed for the
function it performs, antitrust problems may be alleviated by re-
quiring the joint venture to make its essential facility available
to competitors on reasonable terms.'8
The danger of unreasonable collateral restraints" accompa-
nying (or developing with) a joint venture presents another seri-
ous problem. A joint venture, in this regard, poses a danger to
competition that is greater than that of an outright merger of
the participating companies.50 To avoid antitrust liability, the
joint venture must be careful to limit the scope and duration of
restrictions between participants, 51 and any restrictions must be
reasonably ancillary to the essential elements of the venture.2
Even with careful structuring, this can prove to be difficult.
After becoming accustomed to cooperating in the joint ven-
ture, the parent companies may "by outright agreement or tacit
convention" continue to cooperate in other areas and activities. 8
For instance, the parents may be more inclined to fix prices or to
divide markets than they would have been in their previous ca-
pacity as outright competitors.5 There is also a tendency for the
joint venture to be stifled by a parent company when that par-
ent's progeny threatens to expand into products or markets al-
ready handled by its parent(s).5 A statement in United States
v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co." regarding the ef-
fect of such spillover restraints illustrates how the collateral re-
straints may evolve: "The intimate association of the principal
lished for the purpose of maintaining a backup supply of oil. The exclusion of a United
States firm with a history of unpredictable and independent market behavior from the
joint venture is an example of a bottleneck monopoly that restrains backward movement
to supply. Id.
48. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 15, at 137 (describing Terminal R.R.
and Associated Press as leading to such a conclusion).
49. That is, the restraints are greater than are reasonably necessary to achieve the
legitimate objectives of the joint venture.
50. Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1013-14.
51. RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 4.
52. Id.
53. Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1013-14.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 1014 (resulting in "less than full competitive vigor vis-&-vis its parents").
56. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
[Vol. 4:497
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American producers in day-to-day manufacturing operations,
their exchange of patent licenses and industrial know-how, and
their common experience in marketing and fixing prices may in-
evitably reduce their zeal for competition inter sese in the
American market. ' '6 7
Finally, the concern that the venture will eliminate poten-
tial competition requires that the joint venture created to enter
a new market be examined under the relevant standard: would
one or more of the participants in the venture probably have
entered the market separately, absent the joint venture?58 If the
answer is in the affirmative, it is likely that the joint venture
has, as effectively as a merger, foreclosed competition in the
market. 9
Thus, the policy problem presented by the potential compe-
tition doctrine is that of ensuring that the joint venture is not a
substitute for competitive efforts that would otherwise occur,
and is not a "vehicle for nurturing monopoly." 0 This involves
looking at the totality of the market. 1 In remanding the Penn-
Olin case, the Supreme Court noted a seemingly endless list of
factors" for the district court to consider in determining
57. Id. at 963 (dictum). The concern that competition will be impaired is typically
present only when it occurs within the United States. When a claim arises that a practice
or acquisition forecloses an American firm from an opportunity abroad, the Clayton Act
is probably inapplicable. It would be hard to imagine that a case which forecloses an
export opportunity abroad may have the effect of lessening competition in the United
States, yet that is what must be proved. Fox, Application of the Clayton Act to Interna-
tional Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures, supra note 6, at 478.
58. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 173; see M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 248.
59. "The difference, of course, is that the merger's foreclosure is present while the
joint venture's is prospective." Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 173-74. The competition is none-
theless eliminated.
60. M. HowARD, supra note 6, at 251.
61. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 177.
62. Id. The factors included:
[T]he number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the back-
ground of their growth; the power of the joint ventures; the relationship of their
lines of commerce; the competition existing between them and the power of each
in dealing with the competitors of the other; the setting in which the joint venture
was created; the reasons and necessities for its existence; the joint venture's line of
commerce and the relationship thereof to that of its parents; the adaptability of
its line of commerce to noncompetitive practices; the potential power of the joint
venture in the relevant market; an appraisal of what the competition in the rele-
vant market would have been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone
instead of through Penn-Olin; the effect, in the event of this occurrence, of the
9
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whether a reasonable probability existed that competition be-
tween the parent companies would be lessened. 3 Nevertheless,
there is some doubt about the feasibility of proving a case under
the potential competition doctrine, even using a comprehensive
list of factors relevant to the market.4 On remand in Penn-Olin,
the district court found that there was not a reasonable
probability of either "competitor" individually entering the mar-
ket and dismissed the case.65
With these limitations (the bottleneck monopoly, the pres-
ence of unreasonable collateral restraints, and the elimination of
potential competition) constraining the lawful purposes and ef-
fects of joint ventures, businesses are hesitant to engage in joint
research activities despite the many advantages offered by such
arrangements. 6 The risks to competition generated by a re-
search joint venture are similar to those raised by other joint
ventures, although the degree of risk may differ. 7 Furthermore,
there is genuine concern that American industry, hindered by
the "assurances" of free competition that are embodied in the
antitrust laws, is unable to meet the challenge to its markets
from foreign competition, where such cooperation is encouraged
as an incentive for rapid innovation."
other joint venturer's potential competition; and such other factors as might indi-
cate potential risk to competition in the relevant market.
Id. Cf. M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 251-52 (giving a similar comprehensive list, relating
to research joint ventures).
63. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 177.
64. See Fox, Application of the Clayton Act to International Mergers, Acquisitions
and Joint Ventures, supra note 6, at 481. Fox maintains that the two theories of poten-
tial competition (edge effect and entry effect) are rarely proved. Id.
65. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 246 F. Supp. 917, 928, 934 (D. Del.
1965), afl'd, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
66. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
67. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1572. The dan-
ger of the research joint venture excluding competitors from the relevant market by de-
nying them access to "indispensible knowledge input" gained through the joint research,
and the danger of collusion involving parental stifling of marketing or production stages,
so that "end-product rivalry between the parents could be inhibited" are clearly present.
Id. The danger of collusion is greatest in cases where the parents compete in production
or marketing of the end-product. Id; see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 15, at 139.
But see, Fox, Joint Research and Patent Pools, supra note 6, at 360-61, who discounts
the probability of the product of basic research ever being an essential facility.
68. See, e.g., Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1571
(decline in basic research in recent years); Connolly, Updating Antitrust Laws to Permit
Joint R & D, 55 ELECTRONIcS 66 (1982) (supporting previously proposed reform of anti-
[Vol. 4:497
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Faced with this need for joint research and the constraints
imposed by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Department of
Justice published two antitrust guides' 9 to aid industry in prop-
erly structuring joint ventures. 0 The guides illustrated to the
business community the Department's lenient enforcement pol-
icy regarding joint ventures of limited scope and duration7 ' and
those involving smaller companies with a less dominant hold on
the market.72 Although the Department tried to create the im-
pression of being "sympathetic"7'  to joint ventures that might
realistically be seen as procompetitive, it very clearly told the
business world that joint research projects by firms with domi-
nant market positions would be subject to Department enforce-
ment actions.7 4 The government, while admittedly trying to en-
trust law aimed at creating incentives for research and development).
The Supreme Court is becoming increasingly aware of the need for incentives to
innovate in American industry. In construing a section of the Patent Code the Court
recently stated:
The policy of free competition runs deep in our law. It underlies both the doctrine
of patent misuse and the general principle that the boundary of a patent monop-
oly is to be limited by the literal scope of the patent claims. But the policy of
stimulating invention that underlies the entire patent system runs no less deep.
And the doctrine of contributory infringement. . . can be of crucial importance in
ensuring that the endeavors and investments of the inventors do not go
unrewarded.
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980); cf. M. HOWARD,
supra note 6, at 251 n.36 (noting a difference of point of view between the academic and
business communities regarding secrecy).
69. INT'L GUIDE, supra note 41; RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30.
70. Four of the fourteen hypothetical case studies examined in the Int'l Guide con-
cerned joint ventures. Case D involved a research joint venture. INT'L GUIDE, supra note
41, at 23. Indicating the concern over the situation regarding research joint ventures, the
Justice Department devoted the entire Research Guide to the subject. It provided eight
hypothetical examples, summaries of 21 research joint ventures cleared by the Depart-
ment between 1968 and 1980, and a brief explanation of the Department's Antitrust
Division Business Review Procedure. RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30.
71. RE SARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 10.
72. See id. at 11.
73. Fox, Application of the Clayton Act to International Mergers, Acquisitions and
Joint Ventures, supra note 6, at 483-84. The Research Guide was designed to show in-
dustry the flexibility offered by the antitrust laws in designing research joint ventures.
While the Department of Justice considers alternatives that are less competitive than
the chosen joint venture, it "does not engage in gratuitous second-guessing of business
decisions." REsEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 24.
74. See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 68, at 66. Connolly suggests that the effect of the
Research Guide in the business community was muffled "because of the caveat inserted
by Sanford M. Litvack, then Assistant Attorney General for antitrust matters," stating
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courage businesses to undertake socially valuable joint
research, 75 pointed out its concern that under certain circum-
stances joint research ventures could become devices to "retard
rather than to stimulate innovative efforts. 71 6 The Research
Guide conveyed mixed signals." Hence, while there is general
agreement that much joint research would be acceptable under
the antitrust laws, American industry is looking for further
assurances.
III. H.R. 3641
In an attempt to provide these assurances, H.R. 364178 was
introduced to reduce "the extent of liability for violations of
Federal and State antitrust laws which arise from carrying out
research and development programs jointly with other per-
sons."79 Section 1 of the Bill states this purpose and the means
of accomplishing it: for antitrust violations stemming from joint
research and development, potential liability would be limited to
actual damages, the cost of suit, attorney's fees, and interest."0
This would reduce potential liability from the treble damages
otherwise available under section 4 of the Clayton Act81 to only
those damages actually sustained by the claimant by reason of
the joint venture's violation of the antitrust laws.82
Section 2 mandates an award of attorney's fees to the joint
research and development venture if a claimant brings an unsuc-
cessful action against it.8" Currently, a private party bringing a
successful antitrust claim under the Clayton Act is entitled to a
that the views expressed in the Research Guide would not bar government enforcement
actions. Id.
75. "The analysis indicates that much joint research may be engaged in without
violating the antitrust laws." RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 2.
76. Id. at 11.
77. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
78. H.R. 3641, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 5548 (1983). See Appendix for
the complete text of the proposed Bill.
79. Id. at Preamble.
80. Id.
81. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (original ver-
sion at ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914)).
82. See H.R. 3641, supra note 78 and Appendix.
83. Id. § 2.
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reasonable attorney's fee as part of the damage award. 84 There is
no corresponding provision for a joint venture that successfully
defends an action brought by a private claimant. The Bill would
supply one.
Section 3 provides a successful claimant with an award of
simple interest on actual damages in lieu of interest otherwise
authorized by the Clayton Act.85 At present, the court is given
discretion to award interest to successful litigants; this imposi-
tion of interest depends upon a consideration of whether either
party acted intentionally for the purpose of delay.8 The Bill
would remove the court's discretion in claims arising from joint
research and development programs and would mandate the
award of interest.8 7
Section 4 supplies definitions for the terms used in H.R.
3641." For the purposes of the Bill, the term "antitrust laws"
includes, in addition to the provisions referred to in the Clayton
Act,8' section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 0 insofar
as section 5 relates to unfair competition.'" The Bill borrows the
definition of the terms "person" and "state" from the Clayton
Act.'2 In addition, the term "research and development pro-
gram" is given a rather encompassing definition,93 including ba-
sic and applied research and experimental production."
IV. Analysis
The primary focus of H.R. 3641 ' is on mitigating the threat
and consequences of private enforcement actions authorized by
84. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
85. Id. §§ 15, 15a, 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
86. Id.
87. See H.R. 3641, supra note 78 and Appendix § 3.
88. Id. § 4.
89. See Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
91. H.R. 3641, supra note 78 and Appendix § 4(1).
92. d. §§ 4(2), 4(4); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 12(a), 15(g)(2) (1976).
93. H.R. 3641, supra note 78 and Appendix § 4(3); see infra notes 112-18 and ac-
companying text.
94. Id.
95. H.R. 3641, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 5548 (1983). See Appendix for
the complete text of the proposed Bill.
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section 4 of the Clayton Act." It is intended to strike an equita-
ble balance between the interests of companies striving to find
the most efficient means to undertake needed research and de-
velopment and parties claiming damage as a result of decreased
competition. The costs accompanying private treble damage ac-
tions and consumer class actions97 deter companies from under-
taking ventures that would involve questionable antitrust prac-
tices. The importance of this deterrent cannot be overstated."
H.R. 3641 concentrates on three areas of the costs of private
antitrust actions: interest, attorney's fees, and, most impor-
tantly, damages. These costs must currently be calculated as a
business risk in the creation of a joint venture with possible an-
titrust exposure. The perceived risks have dominated the equa-
tion too often in the past.
To mitigate the very favorable award a successful private
litigant receives, the interest provision of section 3 would require
an award of simple interest on actual prejudgment damages if
the antitrust liability arises from a research and development
joint venture.9 This provision would supplant the discretionary
award of interest that is applicable for liability arising from
other antitrust violations.100 While the mandate of an award of
interest would seem to be an advantage to a claimant in an anti-
trust suit, removing the court's discretion to award interest
could actually work to the detriment of the claimant. Existing
law makes the award of interest dependent upon the court's de-
termination of whether such an award is "just" under the cir-
cumstances.101 This turns on whether either party engaged in
96. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (original version at ch.
323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914)). By its terms, the Bill limits the amount of liability to
actual damages sustained by a "claimant." H.R. 3641, supra note 95 and Appendix § 1.
Although, literally, this would include suits by the United States, in addition to those by
natural persons, corporations, associations, and state attorneys general as parens pa-
triae, the change would not be a noteworthy one concerning suits brought by the United
States. Unlike the private actions in which treble damages are authorized, the United
States is already limited to actual damages. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15c (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) with 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
97. Class actions are authorized by FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
98. See Steinhouse, Private Antitrust Litigation, in TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW INSTITUTE 607 (1982).
99. H.R. 3641, supra note 95 and Appendix § 3.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a, 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
101. Id.
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delaying tactics or otherwise acted in bad faith.'0 2 Removing this
discretion would also remove one of the only incentives for the
defendant to expedite the litigation or to reduce its costs. Thus,
a defendant joint venturer would be encouraged to delay and to
increase the costs of the suit; with the risks predetermined, it
would be closer to a "nothing-to-lose" situation.'
The provisions of section 2 allow a successful research and
development joint venture defendant to recover a reasonable at-
torney's fee attributable to defending the claim. 10 4 These provi-
sions would guarantee that the oppressive costs involved in pro-
tracted antitrust litigation would be borne by the losing party,
acting as a disincentive to frivolous and nonmeritorious claims.
Under existing law, there is no provision for the transfer of these
costs to the unsuccessful claimant.'" H.R. 3641 seems to take a
more equitable approach than the current practice of burdening
the venture with the costs of defending its actions whether or
not its business practices are found to be a violation of the anti-
trust laws.'0 6
Although the interest and attorney's fee sanctions are im-
portant facets of the Bill, its major goal is to emasculate the
sting of treble damage awards available under section 4 of the
Clayton Act to private antitrust litigants challenging the actions
of a research and development joint venture. The Bill accom-
plishes this purpose in two ways: first, it limits recovery to ac-
tual damages; second, it defines the protected joint venture very
broadly.
By its automatically punitive nature, the treble damage
award is a potent deterrent to activity of questionable antitrust
102. Id.
103. The converse could also happen. A claimant could be encouraged to delay as
long as possible and increase the costs to the challenged joint venture in order to induce
a favorable settlement. This, however, would require a claimant with the financial re-
sources to afford the delay.
104. H.R. 3641, supra note 95 and Appendix § 2.
105. An unsuccessful defendant is liable for its adversary's attorney's fee. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a, 15c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
106. Cf. Favretto, Panel Discussion: International Acquisitions, Joint Ventures,
and Other Agreements - The Applicable Substantive and Procedural Law, 50 ANTw-
TRUST L.J. 489, 492 (1982) (Favretto commenting that the threat of a treble damage suit,
that of getting involved in costly litigation, is a greater threat than that of an adverse
courtroom result).
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significance; any prospective joint venture would be wise to pro-
ceed with caution. 10 7 There are numerous private parties which
have the additional incentive of treble damages to press claims
of antitrust violation:
Terminated and disgruntled distributors continue to have an in-
centive to sue their suppliers, particularly during these recession-
ary times; more and more large corporations are suing each other
for alleged monopolisitic and predatory practices; the antitrust
class action is still alive and well, Illinois Brick'08 notwithstand-
ing; ...and we are now seeing actions filed by states attorneys
general in their parens patriae capacity."0 9
Prospective joint researchers must carefully judge how the ven-
ture and its effects will be perceived by each of its potential ad-
versaries. 10 This concern, understandably, creates a tendency on
the part of prospective joint researchers to balk. By eliminating
two thirds of the penalty for violations of the antitrust laws,
H.R. 3641 seeks to encourage joint research that would other-
wise be foregone as too risky in light of potential penalties. In-
creased joint research would, in turn, spark much-needed inno-
vation and allow American industry to remain competitive in an
international context."'
Although the proposed legislation would reduce the applica-
ble penalties and thereby spur the desired increase in the use of
the joint venture for research and development, the Bill in-
troduces an interesting complication in its definition of the "re-
107. Cf. Favretto, supra note 6, at 466 (antitrust violation in an international
context).
108. Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (indirect purchasers generally lack
standing to recover treble damages).
109. Steinhouse, supra note 98, at 607 (footnote added). See, e.g., Favretto, supra
note 6, at 475.
110. Favretto, supra note 6, at 475. Favretto stated:
You must anticipate how a transaction will be viewed when challenged by a dis-
gruntled competitor, by a disgruntled customer, or by a disgruntled supplier. If
you can think of a less restrictive way to achieve the desired and legitimate busi-
ness objective, you better darn well have good reasons why that is not an effective
way to approach this particular transaction, and you better document your
decision.
Id.
111. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; cf. Favretto, supra note 6, at 492
(because of the threat of treble damages, joint ventures in the international context are
"underutilized, and unfortunately so").
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search and development" programs to be affected by its provi-
sions.112 Section 4 defines the term "research and development
program" as:
(A) theoretical analysis, exploration, or experimentation, or
(B) the extension of investigative findings and theories of a
scientific or technical nature into practical application for experi-
mental and demonstration purposes, including the experimental
production and testing of models, devices, equipment, materials,
and processes, and may include the establishment of facilities for
the conduct of research, the collection and exchange of essential
research information, and the conduct of such research and devel-
opment on a protected and proprietary basis .... 113
The threshold problem presented by such an encompassing
definition is that it ignores any distinction between basic" 4 and
applied'" research; it classifies them, for purposes of the Bill, as
one. Antitrust scholars have drawn a sharp distinction between
the two types of research and the level of antitrust concern each
raises." This distinction is not one of function, but rather of
the respective effects on competition within the market. Because
of the distance between basic research and the application of its
findings in the marketplace, there is little concern regarding its
potential to restrain competition even when conducted jointly.1 7
112. The definitional problem is more interesting in the sense that much of the joint
research activity encouraged by the Bill would currently be seen as lawful. See notes 69-
75 and accompanying text. The Bill would simply address the perception that there is
great antitrust risk in the formation and operation of such a venture. The Bill's defini-
tion of what programs are to be encouraged, on the other hand, presents a clear break
with established law and antitrust policy.
113. H.R. 3641, supra note 95 and Appendix § 4(3).
114. See, e.g., Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1572
n.168. Brodley defines basic research as original investigation or inquiry for scientific
knowledge that, if obtained, would have no immediate commercial application. Id.
115. See Note, Joint Research Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1112, 1113 n.6 (1971). Applied research goes beyond basic research in that it is
directed "toward the commercial application of existing technology and the marketing of
successful innovations." Id.
116. See, e.g., Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1572-
73; M. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 251; Fox, Joint Research and Patent Pools, supra note
6, at 364; RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 3.
117. See Fox, Joint Research and Patent Pools, supra note 6, at 357-58, 364; cf.
RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 2 (public enforcement equally unconcerned: Antitrust
Division has never challenged a pure research joint venture, without ancillary restraints
and even very few of those with ancillary restraints).
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Basic research conducted by a joint venture raises significant an-
titrust problems only when it appears likely to eliminate all
competition from the research field,118 since this would remove
the competitive spur to innovate.
Applied research and development, on the other hand,
presents a more direct danger to a competitive market when
conducted by a joint venture.""9 The application of research and
the development and experimental production of products, em-
bodied in H.R. 3641, are much closer to the actual commercial
exploitation of the basic research. Hence, when conducted
jointly, they create antitrust dangers 20 that the Bill largely ig-
nores. When the scope of cooperation between parent companies
to the joint venture includes research and design of a specific
product, the minor risks of the basic research joint venture are
"augmented by a possible loss of production and marketing
competition in the research-connected end product.''2 This
closer causal connection between the research and its market
impact gives rise to justifiable antitrust scrutiny. It is trouble-
some that H.R. 3641 would cover activities that run such a risk
of reducing competition.
Congressional approval of H.R. 3641 would give what
amounts to congressional imprimatur to the operation of a joint
venture that engages in experimental production of products,
processes, and equipment. There appears to be little reason for
such an approach. When the joint activity of parent firms that
are, or are likely to be, in the research market is close to the
commercial exploitation of the innovative research, there is sub-
stantial danger of cooperation developing between the parents in
118. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1572. Brodley
advocates limiting enforcement proceedings regarding basic research joint ventures to
cases in which: (1) there is no current competition in the particular research area, and (2)
there are no significant researchers in the field (other than the participants in the joint
venture), or entering the market. Id.
119. See RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 3.
120. See Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1572-73.
121. Id. at 1573. Antitrust concern over a joint venture conducting research and
development is "most acute when: (1) one or both parents are already engaged in the
research field, and each could undertake the research even in the absence of the joint
venture; (2) there are few other research competitors; and (3) the parents are dominant
competitors in the same product market." Id.
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areas outside the scope of the research.122 In addition, an applied
research joint venture among firms that are dominant in the
market could very well hinder new access to the market, ad-
versely affecting competition.12
While allowing both the basic research and development to
be conducted on a joint basis1 24 will almost certainly encourage
the formation of the joint ventures and the innovation impera-
tive to successful competition in the international market, it will
probably do so at the expense of domestic competition. Under
the provisions of the Bill, businesses will be encouraged to re-
frain from competing in the product development and testing
spheres of research, in favor of allowing the joint ventures to
conduct this research more efficiently, with the knowledge that
little productive research is being conducted elsewhere. This
tendency could, however, actually retard the desired goal of the
Bill: increased innovation. As one observer noted: "the more
competitive the industry, the greater the incentive to innovate is
likely to be.' ' 25
V. Conclusion
Although the joint venture has become an important vehicle
for conducting the research necessary for American industry to
keep pace with its foreign challengers, the cooperation inherent
in a joint venture must still be examined in light of the antitrust
122. See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1969) (consent decree); see also supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
123. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. But see Fox, Joint Research
and Patent Pools, supra note 6, at 360 (problem of access to market rarely provable with
a research joint venture since inclusion would not be essential to successful competition);
cf. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 6, at 1571 (though the
absence of competition in research would be undesirable, there is a "substantial basis"
for the conclusion that optimal progress in innovation occurs under market conditions
that are less than the competitive ideal).
124. The joint basic research and development have been "allowed," in the sense of
being lawful all along, but they carried substantially greater risk (or so it was perceived)
than that which would be entailed if H.R. 3641 were to become law. See supra notes 69-
75 and accompanying text.
125. RESEARCH GUIDE, supra note 30, at 3. "The more rivals an industry includes,
the more independent centers of initiative there are, and the more likely it is that some
entrepreneur will consider the development of a potential new product worthwhile." Id.
at 3 n.1 (citing F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
428-29 (2d ed. 1980)).
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policy of preserving industrial competition. H.R. 36411" ad-
dresses the perception that there is a risk of antitrust liability in
conducting joint research by limiting the potential liability of
the offending venture. It does not go so far as to immunize a
venture from all liability arising from its operations, but it is a
step, albeit a small one, toward encouraging the creation of joint
ventures to engage in much-needed research. Even though the
Bill's effect would be largely innocuous, since most activites of a
research joint venture are currently permitted, it remains some-
what disturbing that the Bill draws no distinction between basic
and applied research. Though both these stages of the research
process have their beneficial aspects, applied research, when
conducted jointly, presents a clearer danger to a competitive en-
vironment. The Bill would be welcome if it distinguished be-
tween the two so as to encourage only basic research.
J. Patrick Ovington
APPENDIX
H.R. 3641
A bill to reduce the extent of liability for violations of Federal
and State antitrust laws which arise from carrying out research
and development programs jointly with other persons, and for
other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no
person shall be liable under the antitrust laws, or under any
State law similar to the antitrust laws, for an amount in excess
of the actual damages sustained by the claimant by reason of the
violation of any such law, the cost of suit (including a reasonable
attorney's fee), and any interest awarded with respect to such
damages if such liability results from attempting to make, mak-
ing, or performing a contract to carry out a research and devel-
opment program jointly with another person.
SEc. 2. In any action which is brought under the antitrust
laws and which includes a claim that results from attempting to
126. H.R. 3641, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 5548 (1983). See Appendix for
the complete text of the proposed Bill.
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make, making, or performing a contract to carry out a research
and development program jointly with another person, the court
shall award to the defendant against whom such claim is made a
reasonable attorney's fee attributable to such claim if the claim-
ant fails to prevail on such claim.
SEC. 3. Nothwithstanding sections 4, 4A, and 4C of the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, 15c) and in lieu of any interest
authorized to be awarded under any such section to a claimant
with respect to liability under such section resulting from at-
tempting to make, making, or performing a contract to carry out
a research and development program jointly with another per-
son, the court shall award, with respect to all such liability, sim-
ple interest on actual damages for the period beginning on the
date of service of the pleading setting forth the claim and ending
on the date of judgment.
SEC. 4. For purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "antitrust laws" has the meaning given it in
subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
12(a)), except that such term includes section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such
section 5 relates to unfair methods of competition,
(2) the term "person" has the meaning given it in subsec-
tion (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)),
(3) the term "research and development program" means
(A) theoretical analysis, exploration, or experimentation, or
(B) the extension of investigative findings and theories of a
scientific or technical nature into practical application for exper-
imental and demonstration purposes, including the experimental
production and testing of models, devices, equipment, materials,
and processes,
and may include the establishment of facilities for the conduct of
research, the collection and exchange of essential research infor-
mation, and the conduct of such research and development on a
protected and proprietary basis, and
(4) the term "State" has the meaning given it in section
4G(2) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15g(2)).
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